Who responds

An attack-surface map without a map of who responds is half a tool. This layer draws the fifteen actors who would have to sit at the table of a sector cybersecurity center, and who can convene it, because the value of a sharing center is not scanning: it is knowing, when a threat appears, who to call and who decides.

Governance graph: anchor operators, sector chambers, market operators, state authority, and conveners. The lines are relationships of governance or membership. Source: public bylaws and the replicability analysis of the energy cyber-defense consortium.

The coalition already exists

The structure a sector center would need has run since 1992. CAMMESA, which runs the wholesale power market, is co-governed by the sector's four chambers, generators, transmitters, distributors, and large users, plus the State. The companies you would convene are already partners with one another in running dispatch. On the gas side, MEGSA repeats the mold: the State created the figure by decree and a private entity constituted and ran it.

The convener brings no money: it brings the signature. The Energy Secretariat, or the regulator, can create a coordination table by a zero-cost regulation. The National Cybersecurity Center is the national authority, and the Chief of Cabinet's office executes the Inter-American Development Bank program that already has a private-sector information-sharing output budgeted, and unexecuted. The pieces are there; they just need to be seated. In the graph, the only link drawn as a proposal rather than a live relationship is the one joining that state authority to the sector center: it is the link missing today.

Why private, not state

The comparative record is consistent: threat-sharing schemes work best when the operators themselves constitute and run them, with the State as convener rather than administrator. Two features of the private design explain it, and both apply in Argentina. A private entity falls outside the freedom-of-information regime, so an incident reported to it is not obtainable by a third party. And it does not inherit the volatility of state reorganizations, which in cyber matters were four in fifteen years.

Limits of this layer

• The graph is a governance model, not the current org chart of any entity. It reflects who relates to whom, not a structure already constituted.
• The anchor operators shown are an illustrative subset, not a closed list nor a formal invitation to anyone.
• The link between the National Cybersecurity Center and a private sector center is drawn as a proposal, not as an existing relationship.

The method details every source; the limits close with what this map, whole, cannot prove.