Seeing the energy system the way an attacker does, without touching anything

A sector's attack surface is everything an attacker can observe and reach from the outside before touching a single system. This site reconstructs it for Argentine energy, gas and power, from open sources and without scanning anyone.

Structural criticality of the gas network: each node is sized by how many are stranded downstream if it goes out of service. Loma La Lata leads with 29. Source: reachability over the directed graph of the transmission snapshot.

The rule that separates this from a target list

A map that convenes operators to defend themselves and a map that hands an attacker its targets are the same map at different resolutions. The difference is a rule:

The aggregate is published, never the target

Everything is shown aggregated to the subsector, region, or autonomous-system level. No page carries the tuple that turns analysis into an attack: named operator → exposed host or IP → port. The detailed inventory of what a company looks like from outside is a private deliverable, handed to that company about itself, and it does not live here.

It is the logic by which a sector CERT like Denmark's SektorCERT deploys sensors: it watches the pattern that runs across every company, not any one company's traffic.

The route through

• Structure and cascade impact. The physical skeleton of gas and power, and how many nodes are stranded when each point falls.
• Known incidents. The 14 documented between 2020 and 2026, year by year.
• What is visible from outside. The sector's internet footprint, in aggregate, and its light signature at night.
• Who responds. The actors of a sector table and who can convene it.

The sources, the computations, and what none of this can claim are in the method.

Why it exists

The Argentine energy system has no public inventory of its attack surface and no sector incident register with a reporting framework. The critical-infrastructure cybersecurity program financed by the Inter-American Development Bank starts from a 9% baseline, measured in 2021 (of every hundred sectors with critical infrastructure, nine have it identified), and targets 50% by 2028.

This map is a first sweep of that gap, and what it finds is a surface that is published and uninventoried on the defender's side. The 14 cases in the register of cyber incidents in energy, with a source for every row, are the empirical work underneath.